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Abstract
We consider a general class of nonzero-sum N -player stochastic games with impulse controls,
where players control the underlying dynamics with discrete interventions. We adopt a verifica-
tion approach and provide sufficient conditions for the Nash equilibria (NEs) of the game. We
then consider the limit situation of N → ∞, that is, a suitable mean-field game (MFG) with
impulse controls. We show that under appropriate technical conditions, the MFG is an -NE
approximation to the N -player game, with  = O
(
1√
N
)
. As an example, we analyze in details
a class of stochastic games which extends the classical cash management problem to the game
setting. In particular, we characterize the NEs for its two-player case and compare the results
to the single-player case, showing the impact of competition on the player’s optimal strategy,
with sensitivity analysis of the model parameters.
Keywords: stochastic games, impulse controls, quasi-variational inequalities, mean-field games,
cash management.
1 Introduction
Recent development in the theory of Mean-Field Games (MFGs) has seen an exponential growth in
studies of nonzero-sum stochastic games, especially in analyzing N -player games and their MFGs
counterpart. This paper focuses on nonzero-sum stochastic N -player games and the corresponding
MFGs in an impulse control setting.
A motivating game problem. The impulse control game is motivated by the classical cash
management problem in the seminal work of [12]. Instead of a single-player game in [12], now con-
sider N players, each managing a flow of cash balance. For player i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, the uncontrolled
cash balance is driven by
dXit = bi(X
i
t−)dt+ σi(X
i
t−)dW
i
t , X
i
0− = xi,
where W i are independent real Brownian motions. Each player, say player i, chooses a sequence
of random (stopping) times (τi,1, τi,2, · · · , τi,k, · · · ) to intervene and excise her control. At each
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τi,k, the time of this player’s k-th intervention, her control is denoted as ξ˜i,k. Given the sequence
{(τi,k, ξ˜i,k)}k≥1 for player i, the dynamic of Xi becomes
dXit = bi(X
i
t−)dt+ σi(X
i
t−)dW
i
t +
∑
τi,k≤t
δ(t− τi,k)ξ˜i,k, Xi0− = xi,
with δ(·) the Dirac function. The payoff for player i is
Ex
∫ ∞
0
e−rtfi(Xt)dt+
∞∑
k=1
e−rτi,kφi(ξ˜i,k) +
∑
j 6=i
∞∑
k=1
e−rτj,kψi,j(ξ˜j,k)
 .
Here Xt = (X
1
t , · · · , XNt ) with x = (x1, · · · , xN ) the starting state, r > 0 the discount rate, fi the
running cost, φi the cost of control for player i, and ψi,j the cost for player i incurred from player
j’s control, subject to appropriate conditions to be specified in Section 2.3. The goal of each player
i is to find the best policy to minimize her cost among a set of admissible game strategies, to be
defined in Section 2.
Our work. Motivated by the above game example, this paper analyzes a class of stochastic games
with impulse controls, for both N players and its corresponding MFGs. For the N -player game,
it establishes a general form of Quasi-Variational Inequalities (QVIs) and provides the sufficient
conditions for the Nash equilibria (NEs) of the game, via the verification theorem approach. For
the corresponding MFG, it presents sufficient conditions for the existence of NEs and shows that
the solution of the MFG is an -NE approximation to the N -player game, with  = 1√
N
. Through
sensitivity analysis and comparisons among N = 1, 2 and N = ∞ (i.e., MFG), it analyzes the
cash management game problem and the effect of competition in games and the collapse of MFG
to the single-player game. In particular, it shows that in a game setting players have to take the
opponents’ strategies into consideration due to competition. Consequently, it is optimal (in the NE
sense) that players choose to intervene less frequently; but once set to intervene, players will exert
larger amount of controls. In some sense, competition induces more efficient control strategies from
players.
Despite the rapid growth in recent literature on stochastic games and MFGs, stochastic games
involving impulse controls are almost non-existent, except for the work in [1]. Compared to games
with regular controls and singular controls, impulse control is a more natural mathematical frame-
work for applied problems allowing for discontinuous state space. See the examples of cash manage-
ment [12], inventory controls [17, 18, 31], transaction cost in portfolio analysis [13, 27, 21, 22, 7, 30],
insurance model [20, 8], liquidity risk [25], exchange rates [28, 6], and real options [32, 26, 3]. The
presence of discontinuity makes the analysis of control problems hard and even harder for stochastic
games. From a PDEs perspective, the corresponding Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation system is
coupled with an additional non-local operator for which most PDEs techniques are not applicable.
Indeed, there had been little progress in the theory of impulse controls after Bensoussan and Lions’
classical work [4], until the work of [15] where the non-local operator was found to be connected
with the infinitesimal differential operator in the nonlinear PDEs via the value functions in the
action region and the waiting region. (See also [2].)
Related work on impulse control games. [1] studied a class of two-player impulse control
games. In the example proposed, players control the same one-dimensional diffusion process. Inter-
estingly, their value of the game could be derived without having to deal directly with the non-local
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operator. In comparison, this paper considers a general class of multi-dimensional N -player im-
pulse control games and their MFGs. The interaction among players in a discontinuous fashion
requires a general mathematical framework, starting from the very definition of game formulation,
to admissible game strategies, to the appropriate choices of filtrations, as detailed in Section 2.
The structure of the game value also changes when two players do not necessarily control the same
dynamics even for the special N = 2 case : First, one needs to introduce the notion of common
waiting region for analyzing general N -player games; secondly, one can no longer avoid dealing with
the tricky non-local operator in the QVIs for impulse controls. Moreover, [1] did not consider the
MFG of impulse controls and the relation between the MFG and its N -player counterpart, nor did
they study the impact of competition as their single-player game degenerates.
Related work comparing N-player game and MFG. For an introduction to MFG, we refer
to the seminal works [19, 24] and to the recent books [9, 10]. In the regular control setting where the
controls are absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure, [11] solved the N -player
game of systemic risk with no common noise and studied the MFG counterpart with common noise;
[5] focused on a class of linear-quadratic problems; [23] analyzed both the N -player and MFG of
optimal portfolio problem under the competition criterion, as well as the formulations of both types
of games with relative criterion. In the singular control setting where controls are ca`dla`g type, [16]
explicitly solved the N -player game and MFG of a classical fuel followers problem. The -NE
approximation of MFGs was first established for regular controls in [9, 10] with  = 1N and then
for singular controls in [16] and [14] with  = 1√
N
. Our result with  = 1√
N
for impulse controls is
consistent with those for singular controls as both allow discontinuity in the state space.
2 N-player stochastic games with impulse controls
2.1 Problem formulation
In this section, we provide the mathematical definition for the N -player stochastic games with
impulse controls. The idea is clear and intuitive: N players intervening on a stochastic process by
discrete-time intervention. However, the precise mathematical definition presents some non-trivial
technicalities with the presence of discontinuous multi-dimensional controlled process.
Domain and underlying process. Let (Ω, F , {Ft}t≥0, P) be a filtered probability space and
let {Wt}t≥0 be an M -dimensional {Ft}t≥0-adapted Brownian motion. Let S be a fixed non-empty
subset of Rd, representing the set where the game takes place, in the sense that the game ends when
the controlled process exits from S. For example, in portfolio optimization problems the game ends
in case of bankruptcy, which may be modelled by choosing S = (0,∞).
For t ≥ 0 and ζ ∈ L2(Ft), we denote by Y t,ζ = {Y t,ζs }s≥t a solution to the stochastic differential
equation {
dY t,ζs = b(Y
t,ζ
s )ds+ σ(Y
t,ζ
s )dWs, s ≥ t,
Y t,ζt = ζ.
(2.1)
Here, b : S → Rd and σ : S → Rd×M are given Lipschitz-continuous functions, i.e., there exists a
constant K > 0 such that for all y1, y2 ∈ S,
|b(y1)− b(y2)|+ |σ(y1)− σ(y2)| ≤ K|y1 − y2|.
The equation in (2.1) models the underlying process when none of the players intervenes.
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Interventions of the players and impulse controls. N players, indexed by i ∈ {1, . . . , N},
can intervene on the process in (2.1) by means of discrete-time interventions. Namely, if player i
intervenes with impulse δ ∈ Zi, where Zi is a fixed subset of Rli , the process is shifted from state
x to state Γi(x, δ), where Γi : S ×Zi → S is a given function. In most applied settings, the process
shifts with a simple translation, i.e., Γi(x, δ) = x+ δ.
The interventions of player i are described by the sequence {(τi,k, ξi,k)}k≥1 (impulse control),
where {τi,k}k≥1 represent the intervention times and {ξi,k}k≥1 the corresponding amount of ad-
justment. Mathematically, τi,k is a stopping time with respect to a suitable filtration {F˜t}t≥0 (see
Remark 2.4 below for details), with τi,k+1 ≥ τi,k, and ξi,k is a F˜τi,k -measurable variable, for each
k ≥ 1 and i ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
Intervening has a cost or a gain, both for the acting player and for all her opponents. Namely,
if x is the current state and player i intervenes with an impulse δ, her cost is φi(x, δ), whereas the
cost for player j 6= i is ψj,i(x, δ), for given functions φi, ψj,i : S × Zi → R. For the game to be well
defined, it is necessary to have φi > 0. That is, intervening corresponds to a cost, otherwise the
game degenerates and the players could improve their payoff by continuously intervening.
Action regions, impulse functions, strategies. As seen, players’ interventions on the under-
lying process are modelled by impulse controls. In the model we propose here, impulse controls
originate from a precise strategy that each player preliminarily fixes.
Definition 2.1. A strategy for player i ∈ {1, . . . , N} is a pair ϕi = (Ai, ξi), where Ai is a fixed
subset of Rd (action region) and ξi : S → Zi is a continuous function (impulse function). We
denote by Φi the set of strategies for player i.
Strategies determine the behaviour of the players, as follows. Fix a starting point x ∈ S and
an N -tuple of strategies ϕ = (ϕ1, . . . , ϕN ), where ϕi = (Ai, ξi) ∈ Φi is the strategy of player
i and the sets Ai are pairwise disjoint, that is, Ai ∩ Aj = ∅ for i 6= j. Then, N impulse con-
trols {(τx;ϕi,k , ξx;ϕi,k )}k≥1 (the players’ interventions), a right-continuous process Xx;ϕ (the controlled
process), a stopping time τx;ϕS (the end of the game) are uniquely defined by the following two
rules.
1. Player i intervenes if and only if the process enters the set Ai, in which case the impulse is
given by ξi(y), where y is the current state. Recall that choosing ξi(y) as the intervention
impulse means that player i shifts the process from state y to state Γi(y, ξi(y)), as introduced
earlier.
2. The game ends when the process exits from S.
More precisely, {(τx;ϕi,k , ξx;ϕi,k )}k≥1, Xx;ϕ, τx;ϕS are defined in the following Definition 2.2, where we
use the conventions inf ∅ =∞ and [∞,∞) = ∅.
Definition 2.2. Let x ∈ S and ϕ = (ϕ1, . . . , ϕN ), where ϕi = (Ai, ξi) ∈ Φi is a strategy for player
i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. Assume that Ai ∩ Aj = ∅, for i 6= j. For k ∈ {0, . . . , k¯}, where k¯ = sup{k ∈
N ∪ {0} : τ˜k < αSk }, we define by induction τ˜0 = 0, x0 = x, X˜0 = Y τ˜0,x0, αS0 =∞, and
αOk = inf{s > τ˜k−1 : X˜k−1s /∈ O}, [exit time from O ⊆ S]
τ˜k = min{αA1k , . . . , αANk }, [intervention time]
mk = 1{τ˜k=αA1k }
+ · · ·+N1{τ˜k=αANk }, [index of the player interv. at τ˜k]
ξ˜k = ξmk
(
X˜k−1τ˜k
)
, [impulse]
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xk = Γ
mk
(
X˜k−1τ˜k , ξ˜k
)
, [starting point for the next step]
X˜k = X˜k−11[0,τ˜k[ + Y
τ˜k,xk1[τ˜k,∞[. [contr. process up to the k-th interv.]
Let k¯i be the number of interventions by player i ∈ {1, . . . , N} before the end of the game, and, in
the case where k¯i 6= 0, let η(i, k) be the index of her k-th intervention (1 ≤ k ≤ k¯i):
k¯i =
∑
1≤h≤k¯1{mh=i}, η(i, k) = min
{
l ∈ N :
∑
1≤h≤l1{mh=i} = k
}
.
Assume now that the times {τ˜k}0≤k≤k¯ never accumulate strictly before αSk¯ . That is, we assume that
limk→k¯ τ˜k = αSk¯ in the event {k¯ = +∞}, with the convention αS∞ = supk αSk . The controlled process
Xx;ϕ and the exit time τx;ϕS are defined by
Xx;ϕ := X˜ k¯, τx;ϕS := α
S
k¯ = inf{s ≥ 0 : Xx;ϕs /∈ S},
with the convention X˜∞ = limk→+∞ X˜k. Finally, the impulse controls {(τx;ϕi,k , ξx;ϕi,k )}k≥1, with
i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, are defined by
τx;ϕi,k :=
{
τ˜η(i,k), k ≤ k¯i,
τx;ϕS , k > k¯i,
ξx;ϕi,k :=
{
ξ˜η(i,k), k ≤ k¯i,
0, k > k¯i.
(2.2)
Notice that, if player i intervenes a finite number of times, i.e., k¯i = k¯i(ω) is finite, then the
tail of the control is conventionally set to (τi,k, ξi,k) = (τS , 0) for k > k¯i. The following lemma
characterizes precisely the controlled process Xx;ϕ.
Lemma 2.3. Let x ∈ S and ϕ = (ϕ1, . . . , ϕN ), where ϕi = (Ai, ξi) ∈ Φi is a strategy for player
i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. Let X = Xx;ϕ, τS = τx;ϕS , τi,k = τx;ϕi,k , ξi,k = ξx;ϕi,k be as in Definition 2.2, for
i ∈ {1, . . . , N} and k ≥ 1. Then,
- X admits the following representation, with τ˜k, xk as in Definition 2.2 and Y as in (2.1):
Xs =
k¯−1∑
k=0
Y τ˜k,xks 1[τ˜k,τ˜k+1[(s) + Y
τ˜k¯,xk¯
s 1[τ˜k¯,∞[(s). (2.3)
- X is right-continuous. More precisely, X is continuous in [0,∞) \ {τi,k : τi,k < τS} and
discontinuous in {τi,k : τi,k < τS}, where
Xτi,k = Γ
i
(
X(τi,k)− , ξi,k
)
, ξi,k = ξi
(
X(τi,k)−
)
, X(τi,k)− ∈ ∂Ai. (2.4)
- X never exits from the set (A1 ∪ · · · ∪AN )c.
Proof. We just prove the first property in (2.4), the other ones being immediate. Let i ∈ {1, . . . , N},
k ≥ 1 with τi,k < τS and set σ = η(i, k), with η as in Definition 2.2. By (2.2), (2.3) and Definition
2.2, we have
Xτi,k = Xτ˜σ = Y
τ˜σ ,xσ
τ˜σ
= xσ = Γ
i
(
X˜σ−1τ˜σ , ξ˜σ
)
= Γi
(
X˜σ−1
(τ˜σ)− , ξ˜σ
)
= Γi
(
X(τ˜σ)− , ξ˜σ
)
= Γi
(
X(τi,k)− , ξi,k
)
,
where the fifth equality is by the continuity of the process X˜σ−1 in [τ˜σ−1,∞) and the next-to-last
equality follows from X˜σ−1 ≡ X in [0, τ˜σ).
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Remark 2.4. For x ∈ S and ϕ ∈ Φx, let {FXt }t≥0 denote the natural filtration of the process
X = Xx;ϕ. Then by construction, τi,k is a stopping time with respect to the filtration {FXt−}t≥0 and
ξi,k is a FXτi,k-measurable random variable, for i ∈ {1, . . . , N} and k ∈ N.
Remark 2.5. In single-player impulse control problems (e.g., [30]), the optimal intervention times
are recursively defined by
τk+1 = inf{s ≥ τk : Xkt ∈ A}, (2.5)
for a suitable set A, where Xk represents the controlled process after the k-th intervention. Notice
that this procedure cannot be directly extended to N -player impulse games: In a game setting,
the intervention times of player i also depend on her opponents’ past interventions, so that (2.5)
would not be well defined in this case. To overcome this technical difficulty and provide a rigorous
framework, here we introduce the definition of strategy.
Objective functions. Each player aims at minimizing her objective function, made up of four
terms: a continuous-time running cost in [0, τS ], the discrete-time costs associated to her own
interventions, the discrete-time costs associated to her opponents’ interventions, a terminal cost if
the game ends.
More precisely, let fi, hi : S → Rd be given functions, and let ρi > 0 be strictly positive
constants, for i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. For more technical details on the existence and uniqueness of the
solution to impulse control problems, see [15]. The functional that player i aims at minimizing is
defined as follows.
Definition 2.6. Let x ∈ S and ϕ = (ϕ1, . . . , ϕN ) be a N -tuple of strategies. For i ∈ {1, . . . , N},
provided that the right-hand side exists and is finite, we set
J i(x;ϕ) := Ex
[ ∫ τS
0
e−ρis fi(Xs)ds+
∑
k∈N
τi,k<τS
e−ρiτi,k φi
(
X(τi,k)− , ξi,k
)
+
∑
1≤j≤N
j 6=i
∑
k∈N
τi,k<τS
e−ρiτj,k ψi,j
(
X(τj,k)− , ξj,k
)
+ e−ρiτS hi(XτS )1{τS<+∞}
]
, (2.6)
with X = Xx;ϕ, τS = τ
x;ϕ
S , {(τi,k, ξi,k)}k≥1 = {(τx;ϕi,k , ξx;ϕi,k )}k≥1 as in Definition 2.2.
The subscript in the expectation denotes, as in control theory, conditioning with respect to
starting point Xx;ϕt = x. To shorten the notations, we will often omit the initial state and write E.
Also, notice that in the summations we only consider times strictly smaller than τS : indeed, since
the game ends in (τS)
−, interventions in the form τi,k = τS are meaningless for the game.
Admissible strategies and Nash equilibria. Before defining a Nash equilibrium (NE) for the
game, we define, for each starting point x ∈ S, the set Φx of admissible strategies, i.e., strategies
as in Definition 2.1 with additional properties assuring that the game is well defined.
Definition 2.7. Let x ∈ S and ϕi = (Ai, ξi) be a strategy for player i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. We say that
the N -tuple ϕ = (ϕ1, . . . , ϕN ) is x-admissible, written as ϕ ∈ Φx, if:
1. the sets A1, . . . , AN are pairwise disjoint, that is, Ai ∩Aj = ∅ for i 6= j;
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2. for i, j ∈ {1, . . . , N} with i 6= j, the following random variables are in L1(Ω):∫ τS
0
e−ρis|fi|(Xs)ds, e−ρiτS |hi|(XτS ),∑
τi,k<τS
e−ρiτi,k |φi|(X(τi,k)− , ξi,k),
∑
τi,k<τS
e−ρiτi,k |ψi,j |(X(τj,k)− , ξj,k);
(2.7)
3. for each i ∈ {1, . . . , N} and p ∈ N, the random variable ‖X‖∞ = supt≥0 |Xt| is in Lp(Ω):
E[‖X‖p∞] <∞; (2.8)
4. for i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, we have
lim
k→+∞
τi,k = τS . (2.9)
The first condition in Definition 2.7 ensures that there are no simultaneous intervening from
multiple players. This is essential for the feasibility of controls in stochastic games where the
controlled dynamics could be discontinuous. The second condition assures that the functionals
J i(x;ϕ) in (2.6) are well-defined, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. The third condition will be used in the
proof of the verification theorem where sufficient conditions for the NEs are specified. Finally, the
fourth condition prevents the players from accumulating the interventions before the end of the
game.
We now provide the definition of NE and value functions. Given a tuple of strategies ϕ =
(ϕ1, . . . , ϕN ), an index i ∈ {1, . . . , N} and a strategy ϕ¯ ∈ Φi, we denote by si,ϕ¯(ϕ) the N -tuple we
get when substituting the i-th component of ϕ by ϕ¯, that is
si,ϕ¯(ϕ) := (ϕ1, . . . , ϕi−1, ϕ¯, ϕi+1, . . . , ϕN ).
Definition 2.8. Given x ∈ S, we say that the admissible N -tuple of strategies ϕ∗ ∈ Φx is a NE of
the game if
J i(x;ϕ∗) ≤ J i(x; si,ϕi(ϕ∗)),
for each i ∈ {1, . . . , N} and each ϕi ∈ Φi such that si,ϕi(ϕ∗) ∈ Φx. Finally, the valued functions of
the game are defined as follows: if x ∈ S and ϕ∗ ∈ Φx is a NE, the value of the game for player
i ∈ {1, . . . , N} is
Vi(x) := J
i(x;ϕ∗).
2.2 Verification theorem
In this section we establish a verification theorem for the games defined in Section 2, providing
sufficient conditions to determine the value functions and an NE. This verification theorem links
the impulse games with a suitable system of quasi-variational inequalities (QVI). Note that a special
case of this verification theorem for N = 2 was presented in [1].
In Section 2.2.1 we heuristically introduce the system of QVIs, providing the intuition behind
each equation involved. These arguments are made rigorous in Section 2.2.2, with the precise
statement and proof of the verification theorem.
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2.2.1 The quasi-variational inequalities
We start by heuristically guessing an expression for a NE ϕ∗ = (ϕ∗1, . . . , ϕ∗N ) and for the corre-
sponding value functions Vi of the game.
Consider a game as in Section 2. Assume for a moment that the value functions Vi, i ∈
{1, . . . , N} are known. Moreover, assume that for every i there exists a (unique) function ξi : S → Zi
such that
{ξi(x)} = arg min
δ∈Zi
{
Vi(Γ
i(x, δ)) + φi(x, δ)
}
, (2.10)
for each x ∈ S. We define the intervention operators by
MiVi(x) = Vi
(
Γi(x, ξi(x))
)
+ φi
(
x, ξi(x)
)
,
Hi,jVi(x) = Vi
(
Γj(x, ξj(x))
)
+ ψi,j
(
x, ξj(x)
)
,
(2.11)
for x ∈ S and i, j ∈ {1, . . . , N}, with i 6= j.
The functions in (2.10) and (2.11) are intuitive. If x is the current state of the process, and player
i (resp. player j) intervenes with impulse δ, the value of the game for player i can be represented
as Vi(Γ
i(x, δ)) + φi(x, δ) (resp. Vi(Γ
j(x, δ)) +ψi,j(x, δ)), that is, as the sum of the intervention cost
and the value in the new state. As a consequence, ξi(x) in (2.10) is the impulse that player i would
use in case she decides to intervene. Similarly, MiVi(x) (resp. Hi,jVi(x)) represents the payoff for
player i when player i (resp. player j 6= i) takes the best immediate action and behaves optimally
afterwards.
Notice that it is not always optimal to intervene, soMiVi(x) ≥ Vi(x), for each x ∈ S, and that
player i should intervene (with impulse ξi(x)) only ifMiVi(x) = Vi(x). As a consequence, provided
that an explicit expression for Vi is available, an NE is heuristically given by ϕ
∗ = (ϕ∗1, . . . , ϕ∗N ),
where ϕ∗i = (A
∗
i , ξ
∗
i ) is given, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, by
A∗i = {MiVi − Vi = 0}, ξ∗i = ξi.
Practically, this means that player i intervenes when the process enters the region {MiVi−Vi = 0},
i.e, when MiVi(x) = Vi(x). When this happens, her impulse is ξi(x), where x is the current state.
The verification theorem in the next section will give a rigorous proof to this heuristic argument.
To complete the argument, we need to determine the value functions Vi. Assume that Vi are
smooth enough so that we can define
LVi = b · ∇Vi + 1
2
tr
(
σσtD2Vi
)
, (2.12)
where b, σ are as in (2.1), σt denotes the transpose of σ and ∇Vi, D2Vi are the gradient and the
Hessian matrix of Vi, respectively. Then Vi should satisfy the following quasi-variational inequalities
(QVIs), where i, j ∈ {1, . . . , N}:
Vi = hi, in ∂S,
MjVj − Vj ≥ 0, in S,
Hi,jVi − Vi = 0, in
⋃
j 6=i{MjVj − Vj = 0},
min
{LVi − ρiVi + fi,MiVi − Vi} = 0, in ⋂j 6=i{MjVj − Vj > 0}.
(2.13a)
(2.13b)
(2.13c)
(2.13d)
Notice that there is a small abuse of notation in (2.13a), as Vi is not defined in ∂S, so that (2.13a)
means limy→x Vi(y) = hi(x), for each x ∈ ∂S.
8
Intuition behind each in (2.13): the terminal condition (2.13a) is obvious, and (2.13b), already
stated above, is a standard condition in impulse control theory. As for (2.13c), if player j intervenes
(i.e., MjVj − Vj = 0), by the definition on NE, we expect no losses for player i 6= j, that is
Hi,jVi − Vi = 0. Meanwhile, if all the players except i are not intervening (hence, MjVj − Vj > 0
for all j 6= i), then player i faces a classical one-player impulse control problem, so that Vi satisfies
the corresponding QVI of min
{LVi−ρiVi+fi,MiVi−Vi} = 0, which is (2.13d). In short, the latter
condition says that LVi − ρiVi + fi = 0 when she does not intervene, whereas LVi − ρiVi + fi ≥ 0
when she intervenes.
Remark 2.9. For any player i, the region where she chooses not to intervene, as in (2.13d) when
min{LVi−ρiVi+fi,MiVi−Vi} = LVi−ρiVi+fi = 0, is decided by not just player i but all N players;
it is indeed the common non-action region C. On C, it is necessary to have LVi− ρiVi + fi = 0 for
all i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. The condition that MiVi − Vi ≥ 0, however, needs an extra verifying step: it
is not entirely player i’s decision to wait, yet this choice has to be the best one she can make at a
NE. This marks the subtlety of the NE and one crucial difference between the single-player control
problem and the multi-player game.
2.2.2 Statement and proof
We now provide a rigorous proof of the results heuristically introduced in the previous section.
Notations and assumptions from Section 2 are adopted from now on.
Theorem 2.10 (Verification Theorem). Let V1, . . . , VN be functions from S to R, assume that
{ξi(x)} = arg min
δ∈Zi
{
Vi(Γ
i(x, δ)) + φi(x, δ)
}
holds and set Di := {MiVi − Vi > 0}. Moreover, for i ∈ {1, . . . , N} assume that:
(i) Vi is a solution to (2.13a)-(2.13d);
(ii) Vi ∈ C2(∩j 6=iDj \ ∂Di) ∩ C1(∩j 6=iDj) ∩ C(∩j 6=iDj) and it has polynomial growth;
(iii) ∂Di is a Lipschitz surface, and Vi has locally bounded derivatives up to the second order in
some neighbourhood of ∂Di.
Finally, let x ∈ S and define ϕ∗ = (ϕ∗1, . . . , ϕ∗N ), with
ϕ∗i := (A
∗
i , ξ
∗
i ), A
∗
i := {MiVi − Vi = 0}, ξ∗i := ξi,
where i ∈ {1, . . . , N} and the function ξi is as in (2.10). Then, provided that ϕ∗ ∈ Φx,
ϕ∗ is an NE and Vi(x) = J i(x;ϕ∗) for i ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
Proof. Let x ∈ S, i ∈ {1, . . . , N} and ϕi ∈ Φi such that si,ϕi(ϕ∗) ∈ Φx. Notice that si,ϕi(ϕ∗)
corresponds to the case where all the players except player i behave optimally. By Definition 2.8,
we have to prove that
Vi(x) = J
i(x;ϕ∗), Vi(x) ≤ J i(x; si,ϕi(ϕ∗)).
Step 1: Vi(x) ≤ J i(x; si,ϕi(ϕ∗)). To simplify the notations, we omit the dependence on i, x, ϕ
and write
X = Xx;si;ϕi (ϕ
∗), τj,k = τ
x;si;ϕi (ϕ
∗)
j,k , ξj,k = ξ
x;si;ϕi (ϕ
∗)
j,k . (2.14)
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The properties in Lemma 2.3 imply that, for j 6= i, s ≥ 0, τj,k <∞,
(MjVj − Vj)
(
Xs
)
> 0, (2.15a)
(MjVj − Vj)
(
X(τj,k)−
)
= 0, (2.15b)
ξj,k = ξj
(
X(τj,k)−
)
. (2.15c)
We first approximate Vi with regular functions. Since (ii) and (iii) hold, by [29, proof of Thm. 10.4.1
and App. D] there exists a sequence of functions {Vi,m}m∈N such that:
(a) Vi,m ∈ C2(∩j 6=iDj) ∩ C0(∩j 6=iDj) for each m ∈ N (in particular, the function LVi,m is well-
defined in ∩j 6=iDj);
(b) Vi,m → Vi as m→∞, uniformly on the compact subsets of ∩j 6=iDj ;
(c) {LVi,m}m∈N is locally bounded in ∩j 6=iDj and LVi,m → LVi as m → ∞, uniformly on the
compact subsets of ∩j 6=iDj \ ∂Di.
For each r > 0 and ` ∈ N, we set
τr,` = τr ∧ τ1,` ∧ · · · ∧ τN,`, (2.16)
where τr = inf{s > 0 : Xs /∈ B(0, r)} is the exit time from the ball with radius r. By (2.15a) we
have that Xs ∈ ∩j 6=iDj for each s > 0. Since Vi,m ∈ C2(∩j 6=iDj) by (a), for each m ∈ N we can
apply Itoˆ’s formula to the process e−ρitVi,m(Xt) over the interval [0, τr,`). Taking the conditional
expectations, we get
Vi,m(x) = Ex
[
−
∫ τr,`
0
e−ρis(LVi,m−ρiVi,m)(Xs)ds−
∑
τi,k<τr,`
e−ρiτi,k
(
Vi,m
(
Xτi,k
)−Vi,m(X(τi,k)−))
−
∑
j 6=i
∑
τj,k<τr,`
e−ρiτj,k
(
Vi,m
(
Xτj,k
)− Vi,m(X(τj,k)−))+ e−ρiτr,`Vi,m(X(τr,`)−)]. (2.17)
Notice that (2.17) is well-defined: since τr,` ≤ τr, X belongs to the compact set B(0, r), where
the continuous function Vi,m is bounded; moreover, the two summations consist in a finite number
of terms since τr,` ≤ τi,` for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Also, notice that in (2.17) we need to write
Vi,m(X(τr,`)−), as we have a jump at time τr,`. We now pass to the limit in (2.17) as m→∞: since
X belongs to the compact set B(0, r), by the uniform convergence in (b) and (c) we get
Vi(x) = Ex
[
−
∫ τr,`
0
e−ρis(LVi − ρiVi)(Xs)ds−
∑
τi,k<τr,`
e−ρiτi,k
(
Vi
(
Xτi,k
)− Vi(X(τi,k)−))
−
∑
j 6=i
∑
τj,k<τr,`
e−ρiτj,k
(
Vi
(
Xτj,k
)− Vi(X(τj,k)−))+ e−ρiτr,`Vi(X(τr,`)−)]. (2.18)
We now estimate each term in the right-hand side of (2.18). As for the first term, since (MjVj −
Vj)(Xs) > 0 for each j 6= i by (2.15a), from (2.13d) it follows that
(LVi − ρiVi)(Xs) ≥ −fi(Xs), (2.19)
for all s ∈ [0, τS ]. Let us now consider the second term: by (2.13b) and the definition of MiVi in
(2.11), for every stopping time τi,k < τS we have
Vi
(
X(τi,k)−
) ≤MiVi(X(τi,k)−)
10
= inf
δ∈Zi
{
Vi
(
Γi
(
X(τi,k)− , δ
))
+ φi
(
X(τi,k)− , δ
)}
≤ Vi
(
Γi
(
X(τi,k)− , ξi,k
))
+ φi
(
X(τi,k)− , ξi,k
)
= Vi
(
Xτi,k
)
+ φi
(
X(τi,k)− , ξi,k
)
. (2.20)
As for the third term, let us consider any stopping time τj,k < τS , with j 6= i. By (2.15a) we have
(MjVj − Vj)
(
X(τj,k)−
)
= 0; hence, the condition in (2.13c), the definition of Hi,jVi in (2.11) and
the expression of ξj,k in (2.15c) imply that
Vi
(
X(τj,k)−
)
= Hi,jVi
(
X(τj,k)−
)
= Vi
(
Γj
(
X(τj,k)− , ξj
(
X(τj,k)−)
))
+ ψi,j
(
X(τj,k)− , ξj
(
X(τj,k)−)
)
= Vi
(
Γj
(
X(τj,k)− , ξj,k
))
+ ψi,j
(
X(τj,k)− , ξj,k
)
= Vi
(
Xτj,k
)
+ ψi,j
(
X(τj,k)− , ξj,k
)
. (2.21)
By (2.18) and the estimates in (2.19)-(2.21) it follows that
Vi(x) ≤ Ex
[ ∫ τr,`
0
e−ρisfi(Xs)ds+
∑
τi,k<τr,`
e−ρiτi,kφi
(
X(τi,k)− , ξi,k
)
+
∑
j 6=i
∑
τj,k<τr,`
e−ρiτj,kψi,j
(
X(τj,k)− , ξj,k
)
+ e−ρiτr,`Vi(Xτr,`)
]
.
Thanks to the conditions in (2.7) and (2.8) together with the polynomial growth of Vi in (ii), we
now use the dominated convergence theorem and pass to the limit, first as r → ∞ and then as
` → ∞, so that the stopping times τr,` converge to τS by (2.9). In particular, for the fourth term
we notice that by (ii) and (2.8) we have
Vi(X(τr,`)−) ≤ C(1 + |X(τr,`)− |p) ≤ C(1 + ‖X‖p∞) ∈ L1(Ω), (2.22)
for suitable constants C > 0 and p ∈ N. Therefore, the corresponding limit for the fourth term
immediately follows by the continuity of Vi in the case τS < ∞ and by (2.22) itself in the case
τS =∞ (as a direct consequence of (2.8), we have ‖X‖p∞ <∞ a.s.). Hence,
Vi(x) ≤ Ex
[ ∫ τS
0
e−ρisfi(Xs)ds+
∑
τi,k<τS
e−ρiτi,kφi
(
X(τi,k)− , ξi,k
)
+
∑
j 6=i
∑
τj,k<τS
e−ρiτj,kψi,j
(
X(τj,k)− , ξj,k
)
+ e−ρiτShi(X(τS)−)1{τS<+∞}
]
= J i(x; sj;ϕj (ϕ
∗)).
Step 2: Vi(x) = J
i(x;ϕ∗). Similar as in Step 1, except that all the inequalities are equalities by
the properties of ϕ∗.
2.3 Example: two-player cash management problem
Now let us revisit the cash management game in Section 1, using the notations introduced in Section
2. We here consider the two-player game: N = 2, bi = 0, σi = σ > 0. The uncontrolled cash level
of the two players Xt = (X
1
t , X
2
t ) is
dXt = σdWt, X0− = x,
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where W is a two-dimensional standard Brownian motion and x ∈ R2. Let
ϕ = (ϕ1, ϕ2), ϕ1 = (A1, ξ1), ϕ2 = (A2, ξ2),
denote the strategies of the players for this game, as in Definition 2.1. Since player i ∈ {1, 2}
intervenes by shifting her own component Xi of the cash level, we have
Γi(x, δ) = x+ δ, Z1 = {(δ1, 0) : δ1 ∈ R}, Z2 = {(0, δ2) : δ2 ∈ R}.
This means that player 1 (resp. player 2) intervenes by moving the process from state (x1, x2) to
state
ξ1(x1, x2) =
(
x1 + ξ˜1(x1, x2), x2
) (
resp. ξ2(x1, x2) =
(
x1, x2 + ξ˜2(x1, x2)
) )
,
for suitable functions ξ˜i. Notice that, as a consequence, the controlled process Xt = (X
1
t , X
2
t )
satisfies
dXit = σdW
i
t +
∑
τi,k≤t
δ(t− τi,k)ξ˜i,k, Xi0− = xi,
where
ξ˜i,k = ξ˜i
(
X1(τi,k)− , X
2
(τi,k)−
)
.
Let now i, j ∈ {1, 2} with j 6= i. The cost function for player i under the control policy ϕ = (ϕ1, ϕ2)
is given by
J i(x, ϕ) = Ex
∫ ∞
0
e−rtfi(Xt)dt+
∑
k≥1
e−rτi,kφi(ξi,k) +
∑
k≥1
e−rτj,kψi,j(ξj,k)
 ,
where 
fi(x) = h
∣∣∣∣∣∣xi − 1N
N∑
j=1
xj
∣∣∣∣∣∣ , x ∈ R2, N = 2,
φi(ξ) = K + k|ξ|, ξ ∈ R,
ψi,j(ξ) = c, ξ ∈ R,
for positive constants h,K, k, c. The goal of player i is to minimize the cost J i: we are interested
in finding ϕ∗ = (ϕ∗1, ϕ∗2) such that Definition 2.8 holds.
By the symmetry of the problem structure, we seek for an NE where the action regions take
the form of
A1 = {x : x1 − x2 ≥ u}, A2 = {x : x2 − x1 ≥ u}
for some u > 0, with appropriate impulse functions such that
ξ1(x) = (U − x1 + x2, 0), ξ2(x) = (0, U − x2 + x1)
for some U < u. Recall that this means that player 1 (resp. player 2) intervenes when X1t −X2t ≥ u
(resp. X2t −X1t ≥ u) and shifts her component so as to have X1t −X2t = U (resp. X2t −X1t = U).
Note that A1 ∩ A2 = ∅ and that C = {x : −u < x1 − x2 < u} is the common waiting region, i.e.,
where no player intervenes.
By the same symmetry argument, we look for value functions in the form of
Vi(x1, x2) = wi(xi − xj), i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j,
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for some functions wi. In this case, player 1 and player 2 are indistinguishable, therefore it suffices to
study the value function of player 1. Now the waiting region for player 1 is D1 = {x : x1−x2 < u},
and define D−1 = {x : x2 − x1 < u} = {x : x1 − x2 > −u}. By the corresponding QVI and the
regularity requirement in the Verification Theorem 2.10, the function w1 : R → R need to satisfy
the following system of equations and inequalities:
w1(s) =

w1(u) + k(s− u), s ≥ u;
h2
r s+ c1e
λ2s + c2e
−λ2s, 0 ≤ s ≤ u;
−h2r s+
(
c1 +
h2
rλ2
)
eλ2s +
(
c2 − h2rλ2
)
e−λ2s, −u ≤ s ≤ 0;
w1(−u), s ≤ −u;
w˙1(u) = w˙1(U) = k;
w1(u) = w1(U) +K + k(u− U);
w1(−u) = w1(−U) + c;
Mw1(s)− w1(s) ≥ 0, ∀s ∈ D−1;
(2.23a)
(2.23b)
(2.23c)
(2.23d)
(2.23e)
where h2 =
h
2 , σ2 =
√
2σ, λ2 =
√
2r
σ2
and (c1, c2, u, U) remain to be determined. Accordingly,
w2(s) = w1(−s) for any s ∈ R.
Now, similar argument as in [12] shows that when h2 − rk > 0, c > 0, there exists a solution
w1 to Equations (2.23a) to (2.23d) satisfying c1 < 0, c2 > 0, 0 < U < u. Moreover, if such
solution w1 as above satisfies (2.23e), then an NE to the cash management problem ϕ
∗ = (ϕ∗1, ϕ∗2)
is characterized by {
A∗1 = {x : x1 − x2 ≥ u}, A∗2 = {x : x2 − x1 ≥ u},
ξ∗1(x) = (U − x1 + x2, 0), ξ∗2(x) = (0, U − x2 + x1).
(NE-1)
The corresponding value functions are given by
V1(x1, x2) = w1(x1 − x2), V2(x1, x2) = w1(x2 − x1).
The optimality of (NE-1) can be easily verified by checking the conditions in the Verification
Theorem 2.10.
Figure 1a shows the value functions for both players if they adopt the control policy specified
in (NE-1). Figure 1b illustrates the control policy, with h = 2, K = 3, k = 1, r = 0.5, σ =
√
2
2
and c = 1, where the thresholds can be solved as U = 0.686 and u = 5.658, with c1 = −0.003 and
c2 = 1.972.
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(a) Value functions after change of variables. (b) Control policy.
Figure 1: A Nash Equilibrium and the Value Functions
Multiple NEs. In general, NE for nonzero-sum games may not be unique. In this example, an
alternative NE can be derived by switching action regions between the two players. For instance, if
player 1 is to dictate the game whereas player 2 is a complete follower, the action region for player
1 can be characterized by A1 = {x ∈ R2 : |x1− x2| > u}, and A2 = ∅. That is, let s = x1− x2 then
V1(x) = w1(x1 − x2) and V2(x) = w2(x1 − x2), where
w1(s) =

w1(u) + k(s− u), s ≥ u;
h2
r s+ c1e
λ2s +
(
c1 +
h2
rλ2
)
e−λ2s, 0 ≤ s ≤ u;
w1(−s), s ≤ 0;
w˙1(u) = w˙1(U) = k;
w1(u) = w1(U) +K + k(u− U);
Mw1(s)− w1(s) ≥ 0, s ∈ R;
(2.24a)
(2.24b)
(2.24c)
(2.24d)
w2(s) =

w2(u), s ≥ u;
h2
r s+ c2e
λ2s +
(
c2 +
h2
rλ2
)
e−λ2s, 0 ≤ s ≤ u;
w2(−s), s ≤ 0;
w2(u) = w2(U) + c;
Mw2(s)− w2(s) ≥ 0, −u ≤ s ≤ u.
(2.25a)
(2.25b)
(2.25c)
Now, assume that h2 − rk > 0, c > 0, then again one can show that there exists a solution w1
satisfying Equations (2.24a) to (2.24d) with c1 ∈ (− h2rλ2 , 0) as well as 0 < U < u, and w2 satisfying
Equations (2.25a) to (2.25b). Moreover, if such solution w2 satisfies (2.25c), then an NE to the
cash management problem in Section 2.3 ϕ∗ = (ϕ∗1, ϕ∗2) is characterized by
A∗1 = {x : |x1 − x2| ≥ u}, A∗2 = ∅;
ξ∗1(x) =
{
(U − x1 + x2, 0), if x1 − x2 ≥ u,
(−U − x1 + x2, 0), if x1 − x2 ≤ −u.
(NE-2)
Notice that we do not need to define ξ∗2 , as player 2 never intervenes.
Figure 2a shows the value functions and Figure 2b demonstrates the NE, under the same values
of h, K, k, r and σ, with thresholds U = 0.993 and u = 1.999, and c1 = −0.101 and c2 = −0.133.
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(a) Player 1 is the sole controller. (b) Control policy.
Figure 2: Alternative Nash Equilibrium and the Value Functions
3 Mean-field game with impulse controls
As N increases, it becomes more difficult and infeasible to solve the N -player game analytically.
We will now introduce an MFG framework here for the impulse control game and show that this
MFG provides a reasonable approximation to the N-player game.
3.1 Mean-field games (MFGs)
Consider an infinite number of rational and indistinguishable players who interact through the cost
structure consisting of a running cost f and the cost of control φ. Each player seeks for the optimal
impulse control policy ϕ∗ among the set of admissible to minimize the total discounted cost. That
is,
V (x) = inf
ϕ={(τn,ξn)}n∈N
J∞(x, ϕ),
J∞(x, ϕ) = Ex
[∫ ∞
0
e−rtf(Xt,m)dt+
∞∑
n=1
e−rτnφ(ξn)
]
,
dXt = b(Xt−)dt+ σ(Xt−)dWt +
∑
τn≤t
δ(t− τn)ξn, X0− = x,
(MFG)
Here m = limt→∞ Ex[Xt]. Note that any individual player now loses sight of individual opponents,
we can assume ψi,j = 0.
Assumptions. To ensure that the MFG is well-posed, we have the following assumptions as in
[15] the classical impulse control setting.
(A1) The drift b and the volatility σ are all Lipschitz, that is, ∃Cb, Cσ, both strictly positive, such
that {
|b(x)− b(y)| < Cb|x− y|,
|σ(x)− σ(y)| < Cσ|x− y|.
(3.1)
(A2) The running cost f(x,m) ≥ 0 is continuous in m, and for any fixed m, ∃Cf = Cf (m) > 0
such that |f(x,m)| − f(y,m)| < Cf |x− y|.
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(A3) The cost of control satisfies
K := infξ∈R φ(ξ) > 0,
φ ∈ C(R \ {0}),
lim|ξ|→∞ φ(ξ) = +∞,
φ(ξ1) + φ(ξ2) ≥ φ(ξ1 + ξ2) +K, ∀ξ1, ξ2 ∈ R.
(3.2)
(A4) r > 2Cb + C
2
σ.
Definition 3.1. A pair of control policy and mean information (ϕ∗ = {(τ∗n, ξ∗n)}n∈N,m∗) is said to
be a solution to the (MFG) if
• v(x) = J∞(x, ϕ∗),
• m∗ = limt→∞ Ex [X∗t ] where
dX∗t = b(X
∗
t−)dt+ σ(X
∗
t−)dWt +
∑
τ∗n≤t
δ(t− τ∗n)ξ∗n.
Note from Definition 3.1 we are looking for a stationary solution to the MFG. To solve the
MFG, we propose the following three-step approach. This is parallel to the solution under regular
control setting.
Step 1. Solve the optimal impulse control problem under a fixed mean information m.
Fixed m, the quasi-variational inequality (QVI) associated with (MFG) is given by
min {LV (·)− rV (·) + f(·,m),MV (·)− V (·)} = 0. (3.3)
Here L is given in Equation 2.12.
By [15, Theorem 4.2], v is the uniqueW2,ploc solution to (3.3) in the viscosity sense; in particular,
the value function is of C1.
Now, define the following regions.
• Waiting region: D(m) = {x ∈ R : LV (x)− rV (x) + f(x,m) = 0},
• Action region: A(m) = {x ∈ R : V (x) =MV (x)}.
Then, the optimal control ϕ∗(m) = {(τ∗n(m), ξ∗n(m))}n∈N is
τ∗1 (m) = inf{t ≥ 0 : Xt− ∈ A(m)},
τ∗n(m) = inf{t > τ∗n−1(m) : Xt− ∈ A(m)},∀n ≥ 1;
ξ∗n(m) = inf Ξ(Xτ∗n(m)−)
= inf
{
ξ∗ ∈ R : ξ∗ = argminξ∈Rv
(
Xτ∗n(m)− + ξ
)
+ φ(ξ)
}
, ∀n ≥ 1.
(3.4)
We can establish a proper mapping from any given fixed mean information m to the corresponding
optimal impulse control ϕ∗(m), denoted by Γ1 : m 7→ ϕ∗(m).
For the well-definedness of the problem, here we make an additional assumption.
(A5) For any m ∈ R, there exists −∞ < bl(m) < bu(m) < ∞ such that the above waiting region
D(m) ⊂ [bl(m), bu(m)].
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Step 2. Update the mean information. Under the optimal control ϕ∗ given in Step 1, the
dynamic of Xt becomes
dX∗t = b(X
∗
t−)dt+ σ(X
∗
t−)dWt +
∑
τ∗n≤t
δ(t− τ∗n)ξ∗n.
Assumption (A3) guarantees that Xt ∈ D(m) almost surely for all t ≥ 0. If Assumption (A5)
holds, then by Bounded Convergence Theorem, we can define the second mapping Γ2 : ϕ
∗ 7→ m˜ =
limt→∞ Ex [X∗t ] ∈ [bl(m), bu(m)].
Step 3. Locate the fixed point. Denote Γ = Γ2 ◦ Γ1. With appropriate fixed-point argument
as in the proof of Theorem 2.3 in [24], we can establish the following result.
Theorem 3.2. Given Assumptions (A1)-(A5) and assuming that Γ is a compact mapping on R,
(MFG) admits a solution in the sense of Definition 3.1.
3.2 Example
Recall that in the two-player game in Section 2.3, for tractability we take the running cost as
the penalty on the deviation from mean information. In the MFG framework, we first analyze
a more general version of the game considered in Section 2.3, with the cost function f(x,m) =
C (x− α(m)). Here the target level α can be dependent on the mean information m. For instance,
in inventory controls, this α can be a forecast demand given by Cobb-Douglas function; in interest
rates problems, α can be a target interest rate level, see [6]. Take
C(x) = max{hx,−px},
where h, p > 0, and
φ(ξ) =
{
K+ + k+ξ, ξ ≥ 0,
K− − k−ξ, ξ < 0, (3.5)
where K±, k± > 0 and
h− k+r > 0, p− k−r > 0. (3.6)
For simplicity, we fix b(x) ≡ 0 and σ(x) ≡ σ > 0 in (MFG).
Let us fix m ∈ R. Then the corresponding QVI for the control problem would be
min {LV − rV + C(x− α(m)),MV − V } = 0. (3.7)
Similar as in [12], here we focus on finding an optimal simple policy characterized by the vector
(d,D,U, u) with d < D < 0 < U < u. This is accomplished by solving (3.7) for a classical solution
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with enough regularity, namely, by smooth-fitting principle. The value function satisfies
V (x) =

V (u+ α(m))− k− (u− x+ α(m)) , x− α(m) ≥ u,
h
r (x− α(m)) + c1 exp {λ (x− α(m))}
+c2 exp {−λ (x− α(m))} , 0 ≤ x− α(m) ≤ u,
−pr (x− α(m)) +
(
c1 +
h+p
2rλ
)
exp {λ (x− α(m))}
+
(
c2 − h+p2rλ
)
exp {−λ (x− α(m))} , d ≤ x− α(m) ≤ 0;
V (d+ α(m)) + k+ (d− x+ α(m)) , x− α(m) ≤ d;
V˙ (U + α(m)) = V˙ (u+ α(m)) = k−, V˙ (D + α(m)) = V˙ (d+ α(m)) = −k−;
V (u+ α(m)) = K− + k−(u− U) + V (U + α(m)) ,
V (d+ α(m)) = K+ + k+(D − d) + V (D + α(m)) .
(3.8)
(3.9)
(3.10)
Here λ =
√
2rσ2
σ2
. By [12], we have the following proposition.
Theorem 3.3. Given K±, k± > 0 and h−rk−, p−rk+ > 0, there exists a six-tuple (c1, c2, d,D, U, u)
satisfying (3.8), (3.9) and (3.10) such that d < D < 0 < U < u and
c1 =
h+ p
rλ
(e−λu − e−λU )[cosh(λd)− cosh(λD)]
(eλu − eλU )(e−λd − e−λD)− (e−λu − e−λU )(eλd − eλD) ∈ (−
h+ p
2rλ
, 0),
c2 = c1
eλu − eλU
e−λu − e−λU ∈
(
0,
h+ p
2rλ
)
,
K− −
(
h
r
− k−
)
(u− U)− 2c1(eλu − eλU ) = 0,
λ
(
c1e
λu − c2e−λu
)
+
(
h
r
− k−
)
= 0,
K+ −
(p
r
− k+
)
(D − d)− 2
(
c1 +
h+ p
2rλ
)
(eλu − eλU ) = 0,
λ
[(
c1 +
h+ p
2rλ
)
eλu −
(
c2 − h+ p
2rλ
)
e−λu
]
−
(p
r
− k+
)
= 0,
(3.11)
(3.12)
(3.13)
(3.14)
(3.15)
(3.16)
where the values of the thresholds only depend on K±, k±, h, p, r, σ. The optimal simple control
policy ϕ∗ = {(τ∗n, ξ∗n)}n≥1 is given by
τ∗1 = inf{t ≥ 0 : |Xt− − α(m)| 6∈ (α(m) + d, α(m) + u)},
τ∗n = inf{t > τ∗n−1 : |Xt− − α(m)| 6∈ (α(m) + d, α(m) + u)}, n ≥ 2;
ξ∗n =
{
U −Xτ∗n− + α(m), if Xτ∗n− − α(m) ≥ α(m) + u,
D −Xτ∗n− + α(m), if Xτ∗n− − α(m) ≤ α(m) + d.
(3.17)
Assume the initial position X0− follows any given distribution µ0−. Recall from (MFG) that
V (x) = inf
ϕ
Ex
∫ ∞
0
e−rtf(Xt,m)dt+
∑
n≥1
e−rτnφ(ξn)

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= inf
ϕ
Eµ0−
∫ ∞
0
e−rtf(Xt,m)dt+
∑
n≥1
e−rτnφ(ξn)
∣∣∣∣∣∣X0− = x
 .
Define
V (µ0−) = inf
ϕ
Eµ0−
∫ ∞
0
e−rtf(Xt,m)dt+
∑
n≥1
e−rτnφ(ξn)
∣∣∣∣∣∣X0−
 .
Denote the updated mean information as m¯ = limt→∞ Ex [Xt]. We will show that this m¯ is well-
defined and indifferent with respect to µ0−.
Claim. There exists a solution to (MFG), assuming α is a contraction mapping on R, or the cost
structure is symmetric in the sense that h = p, K+ = K− and k+ = k−.
To see this, notice that m¯ = Ex[X¯∞] = limn→∞ Ex[Xτ∗n ] by symmetry and a Fubini argument.
Note that Ex[Xτ∗n ] = α(m) + UP{Xτ∗n = α(m) + U} + D
[
1− P{Xτ∗n = α(m) + U}
]
. For simplifi-
cation, denote P{Xτ∗n = α(m) +U |X0− = x} as pn(x). Then, by the strong Markovian property of
X¯t
q1 ≡ P{Xτ∗n+1 = α(m) + U |Xτ∗n+1 = α(m) + U} =
U − d
u− d ,∀n ∈ N,
q2 ≡ P{Xτ∗n+1 = α(m) + U |Xτ∗n+1 = α(m) +D} =
D − d
u− d ,∀n ∈ N,
pn+1(x) = pn(x)q1 + [1− pn(x)] q2.
Therefore, we have
pn+1(x) = q2 + (q1 − q2)pn(x)⇒ pn(x)− q2
1− q1 + q2 = (q1 − q2)
n−1
[
p1(x)− q2
1− q1 + q2
]
.
Hence, limn→∞ pn(x) = q21−q1+q2 and this is independent of the initial position x. We then have
m¯ = α(m) + uD−dUu−U+D−d . Therefore, Γ : m → m¯ is given by Γ(m) = α(m) + uD−dUu−U+D−d . If α is a
contraction mapping, so is Γ. Denote the fixed point of Γ as m∗ and let ϕ∗ = ϕ(m∗) be in the form
of Theorem 3.3. Then (ϕ∗,m∗) is a solution to the (MFG) in the sense of Definition 3.1. If the cost
structure is symmetric as given in Section 2.3, then the symmetry can guarantee the existence of a
fixed point withouth the assumption of α being a contraction mapping.
Mean-Field Game vs Monopoly. To compare (MFG) directly with the example in Section
2.3, let us consider a symmetric cost structure with α(m) = m, h = p, K± = K, k± = k. Then
due to the symmetric nature of the cost functions, d = −u and D = −U . Therefore uD−dUu−U+D−d = 0.
Moreover, Γ(m) = α(m) = m for any m ∈ R is the solution. In particular, m∗ = Eµ0−E[X0−] is
a solution. In other words, due to the aggregation effect and the symmetric structure, the MFG
collapses to a single-player game, and its game strategy fails to reveal the interaction among players
or bear any game nature.
MFG as Approximation of N-Player Game We will demonstrate that the solution to the
(MFG) is an approximation to the N-Player game in the following sense.
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Definition 3.4. A strategy ϕ∗ = (ϕ∗1, . . . , ϕ∗N ) is a called an -Nash equilibrium to the N-player
game introduced in Section 2 if
Eµ
[
J i(X0−, ϕ∗)
] ≤ Eµ [J i(X0−, si,ϕi(ϕ∗))]+ , ∀ϕi ∈ Φi(X0−) s.t. si,ϕi(ϕ∗) ∈ Φ(X0−),
where Xi0−
i.i.d.∼ µ, i = 1, . . . , N .
Let (ϕ˜∗,m∗) be a solution to the (MFG) where ϕ˜∗ is characterized by (−u∗,−U∗, U∗, u∗) with
0 < U∗ < u∗. Define the following priority sets
Pi = {x ∈ RN : |xi −m∗| > |xj −m∗|∀j > i, |xi −m∗| ≥ |xk −m∗|∀i > k}, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
Then for i = 1, . . . , N , let A∗i = {x ∈ RN : |xi −m∗| > u∗} ∩ Pi and
ξ∗i =
{
m∗ + U∗ − xi, xi −m∗ > u∗,
m∗ − U∗ − xi, xi −m∗ < −u∗.
Denote ϕ∗i = (A
∗
i , ξ
∗
i ) and ϕ
∗ = (ϕ∗1, . . . , ϕ∗N ).
Theorem 3.5. ϕ∗ is an -NE for the N-player cash management game introduced in Section 2.3
for generic N , with  = O
(
1√
N
)
, provided that µ is symmetric around m∗.
Proof. Fix i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. Consider ϕ¯ = si,ϕi(ϕ∗) such that ϕi ∈ Φi(x) and ϕ¯ ∈ Φ(x). For j 6= i,
ϕ¯j = ϕ
∗
j whose action region independent from the strategy of player i.
We first look at the running cost.
h
∣∣∣∣∣∣Xit − 1N
N∑
j=1
Xjt
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = h
∣∣∣∣∣N − 1N (Xit −m∗)−
∑
j 6=i(X
j
t −m∗)
N
∣∣∣∣∣
so that
N − 1
N
h|Xit −m∗| −
N − 1
N
h
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j 6=i(X
j
t −m∗)
N − 1
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ h
∣∣∣∣∣∣Xit − 1N
N∑
j=1
Xjt
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ N − 1
N
h|Xit −m∗|+
N − 1
N
h
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j 6=i(X
j
t −m∗)
N − 1
∣∣∣∣∣ .
Note that ∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j 6=i(X
j
t −m∗)
N − 1
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ u∗
and by the i.i.d. assumption,
Eµ
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j 6=i(X
j
t −m∗)
N − 1
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
Eµ
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j 6=i(X
j
t −m∗)
N − 1
∣∣∣∣∣
2
 12 ⇒ Eµ
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j 6=i(X
j
t −m∗)
N − 1
∣∣∣∣∣ = O
(
1√
N
)
.
Without loss of generality, let us consider ϕi such that
Eµ
[∫ ∞
0
e−rth|Xit −m∗|dt
]
< M
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for some sufficiently large M > 0. Then∣∣∣∣∣Eµ
[∫ ∞
0
e−rth
∣∣∣∣∣Xit −
∑N
j=1X
j
t
N
∣∣∣∣∣ dt
]
− Eµ
[∫ ∞
0
e−rth
∣∣Xit −m∗∣∣ dt]
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1N Eµ
[∫ ∞
0
e−rth|Xit −m∗|dt
]
+ Eµ
[∫ ∞
0
e−rth
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j 6=i(X
j
t −m∗)
N − 1
∣∣∣∣∣ dt
]
(Fubini’s) =
1
N
Eµ
[∫ ∞
0
e−rth|Xit −m∗|dt
]
+
∫ ∞
0
e−rthEµ
[∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j 6=i(X
j
t −m∗)
N − 1
∣∣∣∣∣
]
dt
= O
(
1
N
)
+O
(
1√
N
)
⇒ Eµ
[∫ ∞
0
e−rth
∣∣∣∣∣Xit −
∑N
j=1X
j
t
N
∣∣∣∣∣ dt
]
= Eµ
[∫ ∞
0
e−rth
∣∣Xit −m∗∣∣ dt]+O( 1√
N
)
,
and therefore,
Eµ
[
J i(X0−, ϕ¯)
]
= Eµ
∫ ∞
0
e−rth
∣∣∣∣∣Xit −
∑N
j=1X
j
t
N
∣∣∣∣∣ dt+∑
n≥1
e−rτi,nφ(ξi,n) +
∑
j 6=i
∑
n≥1
e−rτj,nψj,i(ξ∗j,n)

= Eµ
∫ ∞
0
e−rth
∣∣Xit −m∗∣∣ dt+∑
n≥1
e−rτi,nφ(ξi,n)
+ Eµ
∑
j 6=i
∑
n≥1
e−rτj,nψj,i(ξ∗j,n)
+O( 1√
N
)
≥ V (µ) + Eµ
∑
j 6=i
∑
n≥1
e−rτj,nψj,i(ξ∗j,n)
+O( 1√
N
)
= Eµ
[
J i(X0−, ϕ∗) +O
(
1√
N
)]
.
4 Sensitivity Analyses
To compare the cases of monopoly N = 1 and duopoly N = 2, and to see how parameters h, K,
k, r and σ influence the control policies and the thresholds d, D, U , u, we conduct a series of
sensitivity analyses. We start with h = 2, K = 3, k = 1, r = 0.5, σ =
√
2
2 and c = 1.
We shall see similar behaviors for both the monopoly and the duopoly cases in terms of the
thresholds and policy changes with respect to the underlying parameter changes. One distinction
is that the thresholds and policy changes are more sensitive to parameter changes in the duopoly
case due to competition.
Duopoly vs Monopoly. Putting the thresholds for the duopoly and those of the monopoly
together in Figures 3, one can see that due to competition in a game setting, players take the
opponents’ strategies into consideration. Consequently, it is optimal in the NE sense that players
choose to intervene less frequently; but once set to intervene, players will exert larger amount of
controls. In some sense, competition induces more efficient control strategies from players.
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Figure 3: Thresholds: Duopoly v.s. Monopoly
Running Cost h. When the running cost h increases, players have the incentive to intervene
more frequently to prevent controlled process from deviating too far away from the target level.
See Figure 4a. On the other hand, the presence of the cost of control makes players more cautious
when exercising controls. Thus, an increased running cost encourages the players to intervene more
frequently but with smaller amount of adjustment. See Figure 4b.
(a) Action Boundary of Monopoly and
Duopoly
(b) Amount of Adjustment of Monopoly
and Duopoly
Figure 4: Sensitivity w.r.t. h
Cost of Control K and k. The parameter K is the fixed cost when players choose to intervene.
High fixed cost K discourages the player from intervening too frequently. Therefore players have the
incentive to tolerate a larger deviation from the target; and once a player chooses to intervene, the
size of control needs to be bigger to compensate for less frequent controls. Meanwhile, a decreasing
frequency of intervention leads to an increasing action boundary u. See Figure 5a and Figure 5b.
For the per unit control cost k, similar results are shown in Figure 6.
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(a) Action Boundary of Monopoly and
Duopoly
(b) Amount of Adjustment of Monopoly
and Duopoly
Figure 5: Sensitivity w.r.t. K
(a) Action Boundary of Monopoly and
Duopoly
(b) Amount of Adjustment of Monopoly
and Duopoly
Figure 6: Sensitivity w.r.t. k
Discount Rate r. When the discount rate r increases, players are more tolerant with a larger
deviation from the target level as the penalty is discounted by a larger factor. That is, a higher
discount rate r effectively reduces both the running and control cost, hence resulting in a decreased
intervention frequency with an increased size of controls, as shown in Figure 7.
(a) Action Boundary of Monopoly and
Duopoly
(b) Amount of Adjustment of Monopoly
and Duopoly
Figure 7: Sensitivity w.r.t. r
Volatility σ. When the volatility σ is bigger, players tend to intervene less as the controlled
process is more likely to move closer to the target level with a higher volatility. Therefore, a higher
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volatility allows players to intervene less frequently with a larger amount of adjustment, as shown
in Figure 8.
(a) Action Boundary of Monopoly and
Duopoly
(b) Amount of Adjustment of Monopoly
and Duopoly
Figure 8: Sensitivity w.r.t. σ
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